Of Damaso And The Dark Ages

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Free Carlos Celdran Facebook Page

Activist Carlos Celdran has been found guilty of the Damaso stunt he pulled in September 2010. The man purportedly disrupted an ecumenical religious service held at the Manila Cathedral and consequently “offended the religious feeling” of the faithful in attendance. 

Because of this, the trial court found him guilty of violating Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes those who “in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.” 

Celdran was thus sentenced to an imprisonment of not less than 2 months and 21 days to not more than 1 year, 1 month and 11 days. 

From the point of view of religious zealots, the Damaso stunt may be misguided and offensive. But imprisoning the man for an alleged offensive expression based on an outdated penal provision – a throwback from the dark days of the friars – is simply regressive and probably unconstitutional.

If the State must make a balancing act in determining the extent of protection that it shall accord to apparently conflicting rights – in this case, one person’s right to freely express himself (even to blaspheme) and other persons’ right to have their religious feeling protected from offensive acts – the choice on which to give more weight and prioritize should be a no-brainer. 

Penalizing an expression because it is allegedly "notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful" is incongruous to the current state of our fundamental freedoms under the 1987 Constitution. The Free Speech clause in the Bill of Rights provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech and expression. This is buttressed by our commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states in its Article 19(2) that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression. (Subject of course to limited exceptions.)

On the other hand, there is no such thing as a constitutional right to have one’s religious feeling protected from offensive forms of expression. The Free Exercise clause in the Bill of Rights states that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. This is simply a rule prohibiting the State from interfering in religious affairs. This has no reference whatsoever to intrusions through speech or expression made by a private individual while in an act of protest.

Simply put, penalizing an expression because it offends religious feeling may actually be an abridgment of the Free Speech clause.

The problem is, Article 133 is still part of our Revised Penal Code. It remains effective unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. To my mind then, the time has come to challenge the constitutionality of the provision. This is an opportune time since an argument can be made of the existence of all requisites of judicial review because of this controversy.

We are no longer living in the time of Padre Damaso. The realities told in Noli (and Fili) are best left to the archives, if not the dustbins, of our history. The same thing should now be done to the provision penalizing offending religious feeling.